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Fugate: The Liability of Trustees under the West Virginia Trust Investmen

THE LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES UNDER THE WEST
VIRGINIA TRUST INVESTMENT STATUTE

W. L. F UGATE*
There are at present in West Virginia twenty-five national
banks and twenty-eight state banks which are authorized to exercise trust powers, and these institutions have under their control
approximately one hundred million dollars in trust funds." Since
trust business is still in its infancy in West Virginia, the subject
of trust investments will assume an ever increasing importance in
this state. While formerly the handling of trust funds by trust
companies was sometimes looked upon by the bar as an encroachment upon the lawyers' business, a better relationship now exists
and lawyers and trust men now realize that cooperation is to the
advantage of both.
The bar, as well as the trust companies, has a particular interest in the West Vriginia trust investment statute, since lawyers
draft the wills and trust instruments under which investment
powers are conferred, and lawyers have the duty of directing
trustees as to legal investments.
The early English view was that a trustee should only invest
in government or real property securities2 and this was probably
due to the scarcity of good private investments. In America a
number of states have followed this strict English rule,' while
others have adopted a more liberal theory, based upon the standard of care laid down for a trustee in bther activities.' Almost all
states now have statutory lists of investments for trustees, but the
construction of these statutes has given the courts some concern.
The doctrine in Virginia is stated in Cogb'i v. Boyd5 to be that
a trustee should "act with the same discretion and judgment, in
making investments of the moneys of his trust fund, that a man
of ordinary prudence is accustomed to bestow upon his own private
affairs." The above rule was followed in West Virginia in early
* Member of the Charleston bar.
'Information supplied by office of State Banking Commissioner, Charleston.
SEx parte Cathorpe, 1 Cox 182, 29 Eng. Rep. R. 1119 (1785).
3 Robertson v. Robertson's Trustee, 130 Ky. 293, 113 S. W. 138 (1908).
4 Harvard v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446 (Mass. 1830).
5 77 Va. 450, 459 (1883). In that case the trustee purchased without recourse a bond for $1,250.00, secured by land worth not more than this. The
trustee allowed the interest to remain in default until the debt reached
$1,750.00, and the bond had depreciated $500.00.
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decisions. In Key v. Hughes's Executors,6 our court .quotes with
approval the Virginia case of Elliot v. Oarter7 as follows:
". ....
where a trustee has acted in good faith in the
exercise of a fair discretion, and in the same manner in which
he would probably have acted if the subject 'had been his own
property, and not held. in trust, he ought not to be held
responsible for any losses accruing in the management of the
trust-funds."
The West Virginia case of Davis v. Davis Trust (0.8 apparently raises the standard for trustees in making investments to that
of a prudent man investing other people's money. In ithat case, the
trustee clearly went contrary to the directions contained in the
trust instrument and invested in speculative stock with the 1proceeds from the sale of sound bonds which he was directed to hold.
The defendant invoked the rule of the prudent man investing his
own funds, but the court found that even such prudence and discretion as that was here lacking. The court then quotes the
Pennsylvania case of Hart'sEstate as stating the correct rule:
". ....
future events are from their very nature not
definitely forseeable, and a prudent man has a perfect right
to venture his own money on a calculation of business chances;
all fortunes are accumulated by the exercise of just that sort
of very common prudence. But with a trustee the case is
different; he has all the knowledge, foresight and judgment
of the business man; but the money to invest is not his own
but belongs to others; it is his plain duty, if he would saf.ely
keep it, to minimize risks. He is tnot bound to have more prudence than the other, but he must utilize his, in avoiding risks
which the one who owes no duty to others is free to take. In
the one case, in view of probable favorable results, prudence
says, 'Take the risk;' in the other, in view of very possible
disaster, prudence says, 'Take not the risk.' Common skill
and common prudence, as is said in the many cases cited, are
all that the law demands of a trustee; that is, the common
skill prudence of an investor of money to be safely kept with
such reasonable income as is commensurate with safety of the
principal."
The above rule imposes a clear and just standard and is sufficient to protect any beneficiary.
6 32 W. Va. 184, 189, 9 S. E. 77 (1889).
7 9 1dratt. 541, 559 (Va. 1853).
8 10 W. Va. 228, 145 S. E. 588 (1928).
9 20W Pa. 480, 485-486, 53 At. 364 (1902).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol47/iss2/5

2

WEST
LAW under
QUARTERLY
129Investmen
Fugate:
The VIRGINIA
Liability of Trustees
the West Virginia Trust
The Davis case also apparently rules out corporate stocks as
trust investments. The court said:
"The authorities uniformly agree that except where
expressly authorized by the creator of the trust or by statute,
the general rule is that trust funds can not be invested in
stocks of private corporations.' '10
Thus at the time of the adoption of our West Virginia trust
investment statute in 1931, a trustee in investing trust funds was
held to the standard of a prudent man investing other people's
money. Since the passage of the statute, trustees have been uncertain as to their duty to follow the legal list of investments hnd
have, for the most past, rigidly adhered to it. An examination of
the statute and the construction of similar statutes in other states
discloses the correctness of this policy.
The West Virginia investment statute, as amended by the 1939
legislature, provides that:
"Any executor,... trustee, or other fiduciary whose duty
it may be to loan or invest money intrusted to him as such, may
without any order of any court, invest the same or any part
thereof in any of the following securities, and without liability
for any loss resulting from investments therein: . .Then follow seven classes of legal investments, which are, briefly:
obligations of the United States, obligations of the state of West
Virginia, obligations of other states not in default for the previous
ten years, obligations of political divisions of West Virginia, first
mortgage real estate notes under prescribed conditions, savings
accounts of banks to the extent insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and shares of building and loan associations
to the extent insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The statute is permissive in form, and this fact has lulled some
trustees into the belief that a trustee may still use his own discretion in making investments.
The only case in which the West Virginia court has had occasion to examine our trust investment statute is Davis v. See."'2 In
the See case, the defendant committee, pursuant to a decree of the
circuit court (under the statutory proceeding), purchased notes
secured by a deed of trust on real estate, but failed to first obtain
10 At p. 232.

- W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 101.

12 119 W. Va. 490, 194 S. E. 271 (1937).
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the release of a prior deed of trust, as directed by the decree. He
was held liable for the loss at the time he turned over the notes to
his successor committee. In the course of the opinion, the court
set out the statute as then in effect, and makes the following comment thereon:
"If he [the trustee] makes any other character of dnvestment, or makes an investment without 'obtaining authority
from a court therefor, he does so at his own risk and is subject to the rule of prudence and good faith required upon the
part of all fiduciaries with respect to fulds placed in their
hands. ""
The above quotation from the See case is dicta since the committee in that case did obtain a court order. His negligence was
in not conforming to the court order. The quotation above, therefore, is somewhat ambiguous. One construction would be that in
the absence of complying with the list or obtaining a court order,
the old rule of prudence and good faith would be involved. However, as will be shown, the courts of most other states consider
failure to follow the list or to obtain a court order as negligence
in itself. It is submitted that the statement of the court is not
inconsistent with the latter view, for surely the court did not intend to say that trustees conforming to the statutory list were
automatically exempt from the rule of prudence and good faith.
Our statute is similar to that of other states, and therefore it is
pertinent to consider the decisions of these courts construing such
statutes. It must be pointed out here that the present discussion
only covers the case where the trust instrument is silent as to investment powers of the trustee.
In Wiflis v. Brauchter,14 the Ohio court had under consideration
the Ohio statute :'1
"Executors, administrators, guardians and trustees may.
when they have funds belonging to the trust which are to be
invested, invest, the same in the certificates of the indebtedness
of this state or of the United States, or in such other securities
as may be approved by the court...."
The court held that this statute was permissive and under it a
trustee could invest in bank stock (non-legal) without specific direction from the testator.
13 At

p. 497.

14 79 Ohio St. 290, 297-298, 87 N. E. 185 (1909).
it Omo REV. STATS. § 6413; OHo ComP. CoDE (1931) § 11214.
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In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Worth,16 the Delaware court
examined the law of two states, Delaware and Pennsylvania, since
there was some doubt as to which applied. The Pennsylvania
constitution prohibits the legislature from allowing a trustee to
invest trust funds in corporate stocks."
Several Pennsylvania
statutes designate securities proper for trust investment, with the
words "are hereby authorized", and "may" invest trust funds
in certain securities.i' The Delaware court held that under Pennsylvania law there must be express authority (here general discretion) to go outside the legal list, following In re Taylor's Estate,"
construing the Pennsylvania law as mandatory.
The court also discussed the Delaware statute to the effect that
" 'Trustees, Guardians and other fiduciaries may
invest the funds of their trusts as follows:
" '(A)-In accordance with the provisions pertaining to investments contained in instruments under which
they are acting;
" '(B)-In the absence of any such provisions, then
in securities of the following classes:...' "1
The statute also provides that a trustee may hold original non-legal
investments "until in the exercise of due care, it shall become no
longer wise to do so."
The court held this to be a permissive
statute allowing non-legals.
In Clark v. Clark," the Georgia court construed the statute in
that state :22 "Trustees may invest in ...." certain securities or in
other securities under an order of the court. The Georgia court
held that any investment in non-legals was at the risk of the trustee
in the absence of authority in the trust ,Instrument.
In Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 23 the New Jersey court held
that a trustee should have converted non-legal Prudential Life Insurance stock into legal securities in the absence of authority in
the declaration of trust. The applicable New Jersey statute provides:
16 19 Del. Ch. 314, 167 AtI.
ITPA. CONST. art. II, § 2.

848 (1933).

is20 PA. STATS. §§ 801, 802; Pa. Laws 1917, 46; Pa. Laws 1917, 447; Pa.
Laws 1923, 1059.

19 277 Pa. 518, 121 AtI. 310 (1923).

20
21
22
23

37 DEL.LAws C. 259, § 3875, as amended.
167 Ga. 1, 144 S. E. 787 (1928).
GA. CODE (1926) § 3765 (1).
72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 AtL 1076 (1907).
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"Any executor, ... or trustee, whose duty it may 'be to
loan the money entrusted to him may invest the same in any
of the following securities:" 2'
In Tuttle v. Gilmore, also a New Jersey case, the trust instrument provided that the trustee should not be liable for any
cause, matter or thing except his own willful breaches of trust.
The court held that his investment in unauthorized securities constituted such a willful default. The investments here, however,
were not only unauthorized, but speculative in nature. The New
Jersey court apparently construes its statute as mandatory.
In Robertson v. Robertson's Trustee,2 the Kentucky court construed a statute similar to that of West Virginia, permissive in
form. The statute permits trustees to invest in bank stock where
the bank has been in successful operation for ten years.2 7 The
court held the trustee liable although he acted in good faith and
good judgment. The court held that the legislature, (by mentioning one type of bank stock, thereby excluded all 6ther. The court
apparently construed the statute as mandatory if the same reasoning is used as to the other provisions.
In In re Robbins' W171, 28 the New York court discussed the
English rule that trustees should only invest in government or
real securities, and held that the same doctrine governed in New
York and that any statutory specifications of investments were intended only to enlarge the scope of investments to that extent, in
no way relaxing the stringent rule regarding investments. The
statutes under consideration were Personal Property Law, section
21, and Decedent's Estate Law, section III, both permissive in
form. This case follows V47lard v. Villard,29 in which the highest
New York couft lays down the rule that New York follows the
strict English law regarding investments proper for trustees.
Upon the authority of the cases above cited, which are at
least persuasive authority in West Virginia, it is submitted that
where a trust instrument is silent, a trustee in West Virginia
would probably be held not to have acted as a prudent hnan if he
went outside the statute without a court order. The common law
standard may very possibly be held to have been defined by, the
2 N. J. ComP. STATS. (1911) § 35, p. 2271.
36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883).
28 130 Ky. 293, 113 S. W. 138 (1908).
24
25

27

y. STATS.

(1903) § 4706.

28 135 Misc. 220, 237 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1929).
29 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916).
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statute. In any event a trustee would be foolish to take a chance
on non-legal investments.
At this point we may consider the question of whether or
not a general discretion in the trust instrument is sufficient to allow a trustee to invest in non-legals. In some states such a provision is held to give the trustee such authority,30 while in most
states it is held not to broaden the trustees investment powers." A
review of the cases leads one to the conclusion that in most states
only specific directions as to specific classes of property, some of
which are cited in the footnotes, permit the trustee to go outside
the legal list.
The West Virginia statute also provides:
"When any fiduciary desires the authority or direction
of the circuit court with respect to the investment of any funds
in his hands, he shall file his petition in the circuit court of
the county in which he qualified, setting out fully the facts,
and verifying such petition by his affidavit. '
The method provided is by a summary proceeding and all
beneficiaries shall be made parties. The only advantage of this
proceeding is that the beneficiaries are put on notice of the proposed investments. The court is not an authority on investments
and must make a decision upon the petition, answers, and such
evidence as may be introduced by the trustee. The beneficiaries
are usually not interested in the proceeding and are also unable to
judge as to the -wisdom of investments. In an. early Virginia case,
that court declined to take the responsibility for making investment decisions for the trustee,"3 and this would still seem to be a
salutary rule, which should not have been changed by statute.
This part of the statute is rather ambiguous in that it could
easily be construed as being either mandatory or permissive, and
reference is here made to the previous discussion of 'the investment
proper. The statute only applies where the fiduciary "desires"
direction of the court, but the consequences of failure to !ask for
30 York v. Maryland Trust Co., 150 Md. 354, 131 Ati. 829 (1926); In re
Leonard's Will, 118 Misc. 598, 193 N. Y. Supp. 916 (1922); Lawton v. Lawton,
35 App. Div. 389, 54 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1898).
31 Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 Ati. 1076 (1907);
I. re Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 AtI. 310 (1923) ; Equitable Trust Co. v.
Snader, 20 Del. Ch. 278, 174 AtL. 132 (1934); I% re Robbins' Will, 135 Misc.
220, 237 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1929) ; Mobley v. Phinizy, 42 Ga. App. 33, 155 S. E.
73 (1930).
32 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1936) c. 44, art. 6, § 3.
83 Poor v. Tayloe's Adm'r, Gilmer 336 (Va. 1821).
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direction in investing in non-legals would probably be disastrous
if the trust estate suffered a loss.
The 1939 legislature, in an effort to protect the trustee in
holding original investments, placed upon the statute books a provision which rivals any exculpatory clause ever put in a trust instrument at the instance of a fearful trustee. The statute expressly permits the fiduciary to continue to hold securities originally
received by them unless otherwise ordered by a court having jurisdiction of the matter or unless the trust instrument directs a change
to be made. The statute then provides that " . . . any such
fiduciary shall not be liable for any loss that may occur by depreciation of such securities."3' 4 This would apparently relieve
the fiduciary of responsibility, although he held speculative securities indefinitely, or failed to take the slightest heed to business
and market conditions affecting such original securities, and allowed the trust estate to be entirely lost. Surely this was not the
legislative intent, but the statute would so indicate. It does not
provide that a court order must be obtained in order to continue
to hold original securities, though this thought may have been in
the minds of the code revisers.
In view of the criticism here made of our West Virginia investment statute, some constructive suggestions should be made.
In the first place, the statute should clearly set out whether
or not the legal list is mandatory or permissive. The effect of it
at present is mandatory, and if the intention of the legislature is
to make the list exclusive as to trust investments, this should be
set out. On the other hand, if a trustee is still to be held to the
prudence and good faith of a prudent man investing other people's
money, the statute should define the relationship of the legal list
to such standard of care. It is submitted that the above standard
is a good one, in that it affords the beneficiaries ample protection,
and it allows a trustee to exercise his own good business judgment,
which was probably the reason he was selected. A trustee should
not be penalized for not adhering to the legal list, if he acts in
good faith and as a prudent man would act in the investment of
other people's money. If there is a charge of negligence, the case
should be judged by this rule, taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances surrounding the original purchase and subsequent facts which might put a prudent man on notice to change
the investment.
34 W. Va. Acts 1939, e. 101.
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Government bonds might certainly constitute part of a well
invested estate, but to have an entire estate so invested seems a
needless sacrifice of income, when there are preferred stocks, with
a consistent record of earnings, straight through the recent depression. An exclusive legal list has the effect of placing the trustee
in a straight-jacket and forces him to discard as useless all of his
business experience, all investment statistics and all personal
judgment. If this is not the legislative intent, it should be set
out in the statute that the legal list is not exclusive and that failure
to follow it does not constitute negligence. The value of having a
legal list at ill is rather doubtful.
As to the provision allowing the circuit court to pass upon
investments and indeed to promulgate further legal lists, it may
only be said that the qualities and experience which make a good
judge do not necessarily include experience as an investment
counsel.
The statute should also state the legislative policy as to investment in corporate stocks. There would seem to be no good
reason for excluding these as trust investments, when stocks may
now be purchased which conform to the rule of "such reasonable
income as is commensurate with safety of the principal"., 5
st Davis v. Davis Trust Co., 106 W. Va. 228, 234, 145 S. E. 588 (1928).
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